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The rationale of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the 1996Act”) is to place firmly at the core of any review ofthe arbitral process the overriding objective to give
effect to party choice (arbitration as opposed to court), and
the need for finality. Accordingly, the circumstances in
which the jurisdiction of the English Court can be invoked
are very clearly and restrictively circumscribed by the 1996
Act.
In this article we will consider two issues which illustrate
the difficult balancing exercise which the court is required
to engage in:
1. What are the principles governing an application to
seek permission to challenge an arbitration award on
the grounds of an error of law?
2. What are the principles governing an application to
seek an extension of time to challenge an arbitration
award?
We shall examine these two issues with references to
three cases:
(i) CMA CGM S.A. and Beteiligungs-Kommanditgesellschaft MS
and others (“CMA”), 18 December 2002 (Transcript)
(Court of Appeal).
(ii) Aoot Kalmneft and Glencore International AG and another
(“Aoot”) 27 July 2001 (Transcript) (Coleman J).
(iii)Westminster Oil & Gas Ltd and Barmico Shipping Limited
(“Westminster”) 10 March 2003 (Unreported/
Transcript) (Tomlinson J).
ERROR OF LAW
The previous statutory test was contained in section 1 of
the Arbitration Act 1979 which had been interpreted by
the House of Lords in the cases of Pioneer Shipping v BTP
Tioxide (“the Nema”) [1982] AC 724 and Antaios Compania SA
v Salen AB (“the “Antaios”) [1985] AC 191. In essence, no
appeal was to be entertained unless it could be shown from
a perusal of the award that the arbitrator was either
“obviously wrong” (where interpretation of a “one-off ”
clause was involved), or a “strong prima facie case had been
made out that the arbitrator was wrong” (where
interpretation of a standard term provision was required or
an issue of general public importance was involved). The
guidance of the House of Lords is commonly referred to as
the “Nema guidelines” and this has to a large extent been
given statutory effect under the 1996 Act.
Section 69(3) of the 1996 Act (“Section 69(3)”)
provides the present test and states as follows:
“(3) Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is
satisfied –
(a) that the determination of the question will substantially
affect the rights of one or more of the parties,
(b) that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to
determine,
(c) that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award –
(i) the decision of the tribunal on the question is
obviously wrong, or
(ii) the question is one of general public importance and
the decision of the tribunal
is at least open to serious doubt”
In the CMA case, the Court of Appeal made forceful
observations, inter alia, as to the need to keep written
submissions short and focussed (given that most
applications pursuant to s 69(3) are dealt with on paper),
as well as expressing its desire that High Court Judges
should be slow to grant permission to appeal from their
decisions to the Court of Appeal.
In the CMA case, three eminent commercial arbitrators
had to consider whether a “war-cancellation” clause in a
standard form charterparty had properly been invoked due
to the involvement of Germany in the NATO-led Kosovo
intervention in March 1999. Tomlinson J refused
permission to appeal and gave short written reasons for
doing so (in line with the decision of the Court of Appeal
in the case of North Range Shipping Ltd v Seatrans Shipping
Corporation [2002] 1 WLR 2397).
Challenging an arbitration
award: some key principles
by Khawar M Qureshi
Since the introduction of the Arbitration Act 1996, the restrictive approach adopted
by the High Court in reviewing the arbitral process has been confirmed in the very
limited number of cases which have been presented by parties thus far.
A
rticle
Nevertheless, His Lordship held that the proper
interpretation, scope and effect of the war-cancellation
clause was a question of general public importance, in
respect of which he would grant permission to appeal to
the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that permission to appeal
should not have been granted by Tomlinson J, as the
arbitrators had unanimously agreed that, whatever the true
interpretation and effect of the war-cancellation clause, it
could not have been properly invoked due to the passage of
time. However, on the question of whether a state of “war”
existed, there was a disagreement between the arbitrators.
Sir Christopher Staughton delivered his minority view that
the state of “war” existed in Kosovo at the material time.
The Court of Appeal examined that issue, and also considered
whether the Nema guidlelines had been affected by section
69 (3)(c) (ii), in the context of interpretation of standard
term contracts and issues of general public importance.
It was held by their Lordships that the old test which
required a judge to be satisfied that, on issues of general
public importance (such as construction of standard terms
in a contract) “ a strong prima facie case had been made
out that the arbitrator had been wrong in his construction”
had now been expanded, albeit very slightly. The new test
required that “the question should be one of general public
importance and the decision of the arbitrators should be at
least open to serious doubt” (emphasis added).
In the CMA case, the fact that there was a divergence of
opinion between the highly respected arbitrators on the
issue of the proper approach to the “war” issue was held
by their Lordships to satisfy the new test. However,
because (in the unanimous view of the arbitrators) the
passage of time meant that no war cancellation clause could
have been invoked, the question was purely academic and
its determination could not affect the rights of the parties.
Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was therefore
unnecessary. The Court of Appeal did however
acknowledge that Tomlinson J had effectively granted
permission to appeal to enable the Court of Appeal to
deliver guidance on the new appeal regime. Given the
conspicuous absence of recent authority on this point, the
Court of Appeal’s decision in this case deserves close study.
EXTENSION OF TIME
The 1996 Act contains strict time limits for applications
to court. Section 70 of the 1996 Act stipulates that a
challenge under section 67 (substantive jurisdiction),
section 68 (serious irregularity) and section 69 (point of
law) must be brought within 28 days of the date of delivery
of an arbitral award. There is jurisdiction for the Court to
grant an extension of time, as provided for by section 80(5)
of the 1996 Act and CPR 3.1.2. The approach of the
Commercial Court to applications for an extension of time
has been illustrated by two cases which we shall consider
below:
The Aoot case
Coleman J was asked to grant an extension of time to
enable challenges to be made to an award on jurisdiction.
The award had been made between two foreign parties in
the context of an agreement for the supply of crude oil.
Applications were made to the court pursuant to sections
67 and 68 between 11 and 14 weeks respectively after the
expiry of the 28 day time limit. Coleman J conducted a full
review of the principles to be applied by the court when
considering whether to grant an extension of time. Party
autonomy and finality of awards, together with avoidance
of unnecessary delay and expense, needed to be weighed
against avoidance of a substantial injustice.
His Lordship held that it was important for the courts
not to indulge parties that were dilatory by granting
extensions of time, as this would impact upon the
desirability of English arbitration clauses being
incorporated by foreign parties who were looking for speed
and certainty. However, in the case of relatively
unsophisticated foreign parties, it might be expected that
they move with less speed than more experienced entities.
In that regard, his Lordship set out the factors which the
court should consider when faced with an application for
an extension of time. These are as follows (as per para 59
of the judgment):
“(i)The length of the delay
(ii) Whether, in permitting the time limit to expire and the
subsequent delay to occur, the party was acting reasonably
in all the circumstances;
(iii)Whether the respondent to the application or the
arbitrator caused or contributed to the delay;
(iv) Whether the respondent to the application would by
reason of the delay suffer irremediable prejudice in
addition to the mere loss of time if the application were
permitted to proceed;
(v) Whether the arbitration has continued during the period
of delay and, if so, what impact on the progress of the
arbitration or the costs incurred in respect of the
determination of the application by the court might now
have;
(vi) The strength of the application;
(vii)Whether in the broadest sense it would be unfair to the
applicant for him to be denied the opportunity of having
the application determined.”
In the Aoot case, the applicants had delayed for almost
three months before commencing their applications. The
delay was asserted to be due to ignorance of time limits,
which in turn was attributable to their failure to take
English legal advice. Coleman J considered this to be
“totally unreasonable”. Moreover, the challenges being
made were bound to fail. The applications for extensions
of time were refused accordingly.20
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The Westminster case
This case concerned a claim for monies allegedly due
under the terms of a charterparty. A challenge was brought
to the award of the sole arbitrator five weeks after the
expiration of the 28 day time limit, on the basis of sections
67 and 69. The applicant contended that the arbitrator had
no jurisdiction to consider the issues placed before him,
because any claims arising under the charterparty had been
the subject of a novation. The applicant contended that this
had the result, inter alia, that the arbitration provision
could not be invoked against it.
Tomlinson J considered the issues in the context of the
approach set out in the Aoot case. The delay of five weeks
was considered to be “totally inexcusable”. Nevertheless,
the applicant was granted permission to challenge the
award on the basis of lack of substantive jurisdiction (s 68)
and error of law (s 69) on terms.
In the Westminster case, the court was satisfied that the
basis for the challenges had been made out with sufficient
strength to merit consideration at a full hearing. From a
practical standpoint, a comparison of the court’s approach
in the Aoot and Westminster cases shows considerable
consistency. The key factors are the length or delay and its
reasons, the merits of the substantive application and the
balance of prejudice to the parties.
CONCLUSION
The cases identified above indicate that the High Court’s
gates are tightly controlled when parties who have decided
to arbitrate attempt to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction
of the court. It would appear that the High Court is likely
to open those gates where it needs to settle important and
unresolved questions of law, or where there is a serious risk
of substantial injustice being caused.
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